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175 The Occupation had had other far-reaching consequences. It had
648 removed from the Constitution an article which had endured from
642 the very first—the prohibition against ownership of land by white
423 people. Americans argued that since Haiti's greatest potential source
563 of wealth was agricultural (sugar and coffee in particular), new methods were needed if rehabilitation were to occur. Only foreign whites had both the necessary wealth and the requisite agricultural knowledge: therefore, whites must be attracted into the country by an opportunity to establish plantations. Although the Senate of Haiti protested violently against this reversal of tradition, which struck at the people's long pride in their complete ownership of the land, the Americans yielded only on the point of requiring five years' residence of the white landlord in the country. The influx of foreign whites has not been large, but in the Plaine du Nord and Port-au-Prince the white "colonies" are considerably larger now than in 1914.

175 Up to the present moment the white element in Haiti has not
648 exerted any noticeable pressure on the government. Its mere pres-
563 ence, however, is bound to be a restraining influence on politicians, for most of the whites are Americans, and the government at Washington may not always follow a good-neighbor policy. With the clannishness so usual in white colonists living among darker people, the Americans in Haiti have their private clubs and their closed social set. For the first time since 1804 the élite are socially not the highest-ranking persons in the country.

175 The physical presence of several hundred white Marines for nine-
648 teen years had also one unplanned but inevitable result: an increase in
563 the amount of white blood in the population. For many decades
144 numerous élite had rested comfortably beneath their light skins, knowing that only they, with their greater mobility in the world, had any real chance to sustain a white strain. The Occupation, however, brought white men in contact with black women; there was a steady average of 2,000 white Marines in the country for two
[594] decades. The light skin of resulting offspring suggested to many the possibility of a climb up the social ladder now that the most difficult rung had already been achieved. No figures are available on the number of children born in Haiti between 1915 and 1934 of white fathers, but it was a perceptible influx in the lower class.

175 Haitian businessmen enjoyed a greater economic prosperity during
+ 58 the Occupation than they had ever known before. It is commonly

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reported in Haiti that although they joined patriotically in the cheering when the Marines embarked in 1934, many of them shed tears to see the departure of 2,000 monthly salaries, most of which had been enriching the local tills. Indeed, the country came much closer to establishing a mercantile middle class during the Occupation than ever before. The only real control left behind by the Americans was an overseer of the national budget, destined to leave as soon as Haiti's external debt was finally paid off. To that end the government saved rather than spent, so that businessmen found no comfort in the state of economic affairs, particularly during a decade of world depression and European disturbance. Nationalist economic theories in Europe have upset Haitian markets, so that the elite thriftily save their pennies against hard times instead of spending them freely on present luxuries. The American overseer of the budget withdrew in 1941.

At many points the forces of the Occupation touched unwittingly upon deep-rooted prejudices of the Haitian people. In order to secure laborers for road construction the Marines revived an old corvée law of Christophe's time, requiring forced labor on public works at the need of the government. Many of the ill-nourished peasants were taxed beyond their physical power by work on the roads, so that an armed revolt by caco guerrillas broke out. Its suppression required months of time and cost many lives, leaving in its train a great deal of ill will.

The efficient Americans also came to grief when they attempted to make Haitians orderly in the American way. Land titles were in chaos, as we have noted. American experts wished to find a basis for internal taxation, so that economic reform might be effective and permanent. The effort to have people declare their claims so that these might be properly registered had to be given up after a few weeks, for the peasant owners knew without written deeds their local boundaries, and among the squatters those who realized their title might not stand under strict investigation were understandably averse to having questions of property rights raised by the authorities of an alien and interfering government.

Wherever Marine barracks were located, there were centers of a cultural dissemination which was bound in the long run to affect Haitian ideas and practices. Automobiles, radios, amusements, even the daily conversation of the Marines, all left their mark upon a people who had been effectively isolated from the world for more than a century.

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lie except in raw form, in which it had an annual sale of only a few thousand pounds. Other subordinate exports were cotton, logwood, lignum vitae, mahogany, tortoise shells, hides, cacao, cassia, wax, ginger, bullocks' horns, and tobacco—and many of these came primarily from the Dominican rather than the Haitian part of the island, during the twenty-two year period of union. The imports were mainly clothing and provisions. That an agricultural country should need to bring in flour, butter, cheese, lard, beef, pork, candles, and especially—in the light of former days—refined sugar, is eloquent testimony to the degree to which food production had declined since colonial times. Other imports were more to be expected, since manufacture had never developed: linen, cotton goods of all kinds, some few woolens, cutlery, iron goods, wines and brandies, oil, lumber, coarse iron goods, earthenware, tin plates, and minor articles."

Gone now were the days of big things in Haiti. Estates of thousands of acres would in Boyer's time have been only a liability. Profits were measured, or rather hoped for, in terms of hundreds rather than thousands of dollars." Saint-Domingue of the 1780's was one of the exciting parts of the world to readers; Haiti of fifty years later was little more than a vague name except to specialists. Any country relying for its economic security upon one crop and its sale in a foreign market must expect vicissitudes in its income. Haiti had these in full measure. And so the prosperity of the country steadily diminished."

11. See the very candid report to Great Britain by her consul, Charles Mackenzie, in 1830: Notes on Hayti, II, 177–190.

12. Mackenzie [Commissioners' Report of the Foreign Office [of Great Britain] Relative to Hayti, Document XII] reports in 1830: "Generally speaking, no sugar is manufactured on the estates devoted to the cultivation of the sugar cane; the juice is either lapidated to a coarse syrup, and sold for common use, or distilled into a very inferior rum, called here 'Tafia.'" Thus, citing the case of Tor, an estate formerly owned by Pétion but in 1825 by Boyer, he reports: "Formerly 1,700 carreaux were in cane; 1,200 slaves were employed on it; 3 sugar mills were constantly at work, and excellent clayed sugar was made. Now only about 7 carreaux are in cultivation; 30 laborers are employed; the only produce is a little rum and tafia, which last is retailed in a small shop by the side of the road, in front of the president's residence."

13. These calculations have been frequently noted. Droughts and hurricanes, pests and earthquakes, were causes of constant apprehension. The chief factor in Haiti's decline in prosperity was never the division of land into small parcels or farms, and the cooperation of other countries with Haitian traders showed. The price of coffee had declined in all the European markets, making the return to the cultivator extremely small.

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3. *Pétion, Boyer, and Inginac as Administrators*

Pétion lived very simply in the South, like a plain republican magistrate. He sat on his piazza, accessible to all his people. He had a quiet way of answering his opponents which did not make enemies of them. He made his secretary answer every letter that arrived, no matter how small; many were simply inquiries about the President's health. Yet the war between Pétion and Christophe dragged on from 1807 to 1813,[1] draining the finances of the republic. Not only the crops declined; so also did most of the public improvements instituted by the colonial planters; so did trade; so did habits of industry. Everything seemed to conspire against hard work. The rich plains of the Cul-de-Sac and the Artibonite Valley were ravaged by fire and warfare; necessary equipment for sugar making was destroyed; the money for new machines and buildings was unavailable; and the men were drawn away from their land by military duties.

Inginac, Boyer's secretary of state, after the Revolution of 1843 had got rid of both the President and his secretary, wrote his memoirs. There are some revealing passages. Inginac reports that Pétion said him only forty days before his death that Boyer was a man of probity and delicacy, "but unhappily he is penniless; he is too set in his ways to conciliate those who might assist him. In everything he wants to dominate, and he will bring unhappiness to the country if he does not change." Inginac does seem to show that Pétion's prophecy was correct. Boyer in 1826 revoked the most unpopular laws, particularly those requiring personal corvée and the repair of public roads; but instead of taking advice from his cabinet on important economic matters, he frequently announced that he was president and would not be run by anybody. Consequently, according to Inginac, he made mistakes which might have been avoided.[2] Defending himself, the former secretary offers a clue to the failure of the régime—possibly unavoidable—by showing that the administration merely suggested, did not require, action:

"Have I not constantly, not only preached and commended above the necessity of making agriculture prosperous, but also given work at as high wages as the country could afford? Have I not created fabrications on lands formerly totally uncultivated, putting formerly idle men to work? Have I not published at my own expense, although I directed the National Printery, methods for cultivating tobacco and coffee plants, of which I distributed gratis several thousand copies?"

In spite of all encouragement which the administration could offer, agricultural production continued to decline, while expenses increased, and external trade fell off from a third to a half. The government had to borrow from the banking firm of [illegible] in Paris to [illegible]

1. Hostilities between the two parts of Haiti ceased about 1813 because of the external foes on the part of Christophe and Pétion of Napoleon's ascendancy, and the threat which this constituted to the whole former colony. There war had corrupted the plantations and removed laborers from the soil. Then came the War of 1812 between the United States and Great Britain, cutting off many of the supplies which Haiti drew from both countries. There was accordingly an unwritten truce, with no further hostilities. A neutral territory of ten leagues between the boundaries of the two states was mutually agreed upon; neither army was to enter it. This was the rich plain of Fonsaint, once the garden of the island, now a wilderness.

2. Joseph Balthazar Inginac, *Mémoire* (Kingston, Jamaica, 1843), pp. 33, 34, 35.
3. Ibid., p. 38.
payments also to the French government.